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Abstract
This article provides empirical evidence to support the Agency Theory as applied to small 
and medium-sized family firms. The research, conducted on a sample of SMEs (N = 88), has 
investigated the main elements of the Agency Theory ( type of contract,  agent autonomy, 
mechanisms of resource distribution, the match between job assignment and worker skills, the 
overall level of perceived organizational justice), using a qualitative method.
The  literature  suggests  that  altruism  of  the  Principal  as  a  parent  and  widespread 
opportunistic behavior by the Agent are confirmed phenomena typical of family SMEs. In 
addition,  the  research  highlights  the  implications  in  terms  of  agency costs  and perceived 
organizational justice on the part of employees who are not members of the family. Finally, 
this article suggests the causes and reasons for such altruistic and opportunistic behavior.
Key Words: Family  Business;  Agency  Theory;  Organizational  justice; 
Opportunistic Behavior.
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INTRODUCTION 
Early  work  on the  Agency Theory  (Jensen,  Meckling,  1976;  Ross,  1973)  attributed  a 
specific situation favorable to the family firm. The sense of belonging of family members 
would protect the company from the opportunistic behavior of its members, to the benefit of 
the overall agency costs. This position has been challenged by the economy of the family 
(Becker,  1981):  family  firms  are  characterized  by  opportunistic  behavior  and  altruism 
expressed  by  parents  (the  Principal),  generating  costs  related  to  adverse  selection  (eg, 
selection of their children according to criteria of belonging and not of expertise: Lansberg, 
1983; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, 2003; Chirsman, Chua, Litz, 2004; Schulze, Lubatkin, Dino, 
Bucholtz,  2001). Also,  the little  empirical  evidence available  relating to the Italian SMEs 
(Gagliano Spina, 2000; Biasetti et al, 2009) emphasizes the limited diffusion of managerial 
practices  in  the  SMEs  themselves.  These  practices  (accounting  control,  total  quality 
management,  management  by objectives,  use of  rewards  and incentives)  would allow the 
Agent’s behavior (family or not) to be monitored and to align his objectives with those of the 
company . On the other hand, an alternative approach based on the stewardship theory (Davis 
et al, 1997)  suggests that workers who are members of family firms feel that they own and 
pursue non-economic  objectives of  the  company (Corbetta,  Salvato,  2004).  The literature 
offers little empirical evidence for the difficulty of direct study of worker behavior in family 
businesses, especially SMEs. Among the few studies, that of Chrisman et al (2007) seems to 
show that  workers’ family  members act  as agents,  contrary  to  the  expectations  of the 
stewardship theory and the first formulation of the Agency Theory. Hence the need, recently 
made explicit (Pieper, 2010), to integrate the perspective founded on the agency relationship 
(considered too 'rational')  in a model that takes into account other psychological variables 
rather than economic ones, able to explain behavior such as adverse selection or opportunism 
of the agent in SMEs family.
1 THE THEORETICAL MODEL
The Agency Theory describes the exchange relationship between an actor ( the Principal) 
which delegates to another actor ( the Agent ) the discretionary power (i.e., decision-making 
responsibilities ) to act on behalf of the Principal for reward (Jensen, Meckling, 1976; Ross, 
1973). This report aims to align the objectives of the Agent to those of the Principal, in order 
to reach the desired effectiveness (for a review, Eisenhardt, 1989). The Agency Theory also 
makes it possible to identify the most efficient type of contract in terms of organization costs, 
which are determined by the remuneration that it is necessary to give the Agent to induce him 
to  accept  the  risk.  This  theory  is  considered  to  be  a  powerful  model  for  explaining  the 
relationship  between the parts  of  an organization  (Jensen,  1983) but  it  is  also considered 
dehumanizing and even '  dangerous '  (Perrow, 1986).  In regard to  the application of this 
model to the family firms, the literature suggests that the trade- off between Principal and 
Agent is affected by several factors, which can in turn improve or diminish its efficiency .
First, family firms, especially SMEs, are characterized by the overlap between ownership 
and  management.  This institutional  overlap (Landsberg,  1983) brings  the Principal (the 
entrepreneur, i.e., the parent) to act in a conflict of interest, since the role of control exercised 
by an external property is lacking, and exposes Principal to the risk of decisions functional to 
the pursuit of non-economic objectives but of business interest.  Parental altruism (Schulze, 
Lubatkin, Dino, 2003; Karra el al, 2006; Lubatkin, Durand, Ling, 2007) is a second variable 
to  take into consideration  in  the traditional  model of the  agency theory.  The parent-child 
relationship is characterized, even in business contexts, by attitudes and acts of generosity on 
the part of the older generation, according to a universal model of the relationship of care and 
help. This feature makes the Principal run the risk of acting once again in a functional manner 
in the pursuit of non-economic objectives. Altruism can generate different types of problems 
in the agency relationship, which decrease efficiency. First, parental altruism and conflict of 
interest can lead to adverse selection, and thus to staffing incompetent family members, with 
obvious  negative  impact  on performance.  Second,  parental  altruism can lead  to  assigning 
benefits (economic and otherwise) to family members, regardless of their merit, laying the 
groundwork for future deviant behavior (Eddleston,  Kidwell,  2010), and at the same time 
discriminating against non-family members. In both cases, it also generates a disutility for the 
firm.  Also,  since the  literature  describes  altruism as  asymmetrical  (Bergstrom,  1989),  the 
Agent (the family member) can trigger opportunistic behavior, again generating costs for the 
firm. Third, in the presence of workers who are not family members, parental altruism can 
generate  favoritism  toward  relatives  and  discrimination  towards  others,  with  a  negative 
impact on perceived organizational justice (see below). Social psychology provides a third 
element to be introduced into the model: the categorization of oneself as a member of a group 
(Tajfel, Turner, 1986). Ample literature, almost exclusively psycho-social (with the exception 
of  De Massis,  2012),  describes  the  mechanisms  and  conditions under  which individual 
behavior is determined not by individual characteristics but by those of the group to which it 
is believed to belong. This condition raises the risk of the Principal (and for all members of 
the family working  in  the  company)  to  favor  the ingroup (the  members perceived  as 
belonging to the same group) and at the same time to descriminate against the outgroup (those 
who considered to belong to groups outside one's own). Behind it all, then, there seems to be a 
phenomenon  of social  categorization (Tajfel,  1970, 1971),  a  mechanism  under  which the 
social world is divided and sorted into categories. But the categorization, in itself, would not 
justify favoritism towards the ingroup (i.e., the category to which one feels he belongs): it is 
necessary for the categorization to be based on the individual's Social Identity Theory (SIT), 
which consists in his conception of himself as a member of a group. And since people tend to 
have a satisfactory self-conception (to protect their  self-esteem),  then comes favoritism.  In 
these  terms, an  intergroup conflict is  a  competition for  prestige as much  as  for material 
resources.
Organizations are economic institutions, but not only, and to neglect this aspect may have 
undesirable effects (Cropanzano, Bowen, Gilliland, 2007). The exclusive pursuit of efficiency 
and  effectiveness can  be  counterproductive for  an  organization. The  members of  an 
organization obviously want the benefits, economic and otherwise, but also something else: 
they want  organizational  justice (organizational  justice,  henceforth OJ,  which  is  the 
perception of the moral  quality of how they are treated by the organization and by other 
members. OJ has been much studied in recent years, and was the subject of two meta-analyses 
at  the  beginning of  the  century (Cohen-Carash,  Spector,  2001;  Colquitt et  al,  2001). 
Cropanzano, Bowen and Gilliland (2007), based on the existing literature,  point out that the 
members of an organization assess, with regard to justice, three different aspects: criteria for 
the distribution  of  resources  (distributive  justice);  procedures relative  to  distribution of 
resources (procedural justice)  and justice arising from interpersonal relationships (relational 
justice). The three dimensions tend to be related, and may be considered as three components 
of the same construct (Ambrose,  Arnaud,  2005; Ambrose,  Schminke,  2007). But,  although 
related,  they have different antecedents, and thus it is useful to treat them  separately. One 
hypothesis of this article is that family-firms differ from non-family ones as regards the level 
of OJ, lower in the former than in the latter. The primary source of organizational injustice in 
fact seems to be the overlap between family and business (Lansberg, 1989).
Family and firm are two institutions with different objectives (the welfare and protection of 
their family members the former, profit the latter), goals that may conflict. The literature also 
describes the impact on the perception of injustice in phenomena such as nepotism (Padgett, 
Morris, 2005), authoritarianism (Tagiuri, Davis, 1992), management practices, discrimination 
towards non- family staff members (Barnett, Kellermans , 2006; Lubatkin et al, 2007; Schulze 
et  al,  2001),  the  perception  of  non-members  as  'foreign'  (Barnett,  Kellermans,  2006;  De 
Massis, 2012),  organizational  culture  centered  on  the  founder  (Schein,  1983),  and  little 
recourse to delegation (Kelly et al , 2000).
Figure 1: Theoretical model
 In addition, since the family-owned company also pursues non-economic objectives, these 
can increase the perception of injustice by non- members, since these goals are not of interest 
to them (Chrisman, Memili, Misra, 2013).  However, at the moment there  is  little empirical 
evidence  (Barnett,  Kellermans,  2006; Carsrud,  2006; Sieger,  Bernhard Frey, 2011). In 
particular, recent research suggests (Bassanini  et  al.,  2011; Block et  al,  2013)  that family 
members are more satisfied than non-members, and have a greater sense of security (linked to 
the tenure of the job)  but receive lower wages,  with the exception of the females,  who,  if 
family members, have wage levels higher than ‘foreign’ females  (about 5% more: Block et 
al,  2013). The theoretical model (represented  in Figure 1) is then defined in the following 
formal terms.
Given the null hypothesis H0: no difference in behavior, in a family firm, to family members 
than non-members, on the basis of the above considerations, it is possible to make four 
working hypotheses:
H1: family firms are characterized by adverse selection of family members
H2: family firms are characterized by opportunism of family members
H3: family firms are characterized by discrimination against non-family members
H4: In family firm, non-family members have low levels of perceived organizational justice
The  literature  provides extensive  evidence of  the negative  impact of  such  mechanisms 
(adverse  selection,  opportunism,  discrimination) on  the cost  of  management and on 
organizational justice.  In particular, the literature provides evidence of specific effects such 
as: 1) higher costs due to inefficiencies in the transfer of risk (e.g., a higher rate of pay  for 
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non-family members: Block et al, 2013), 2) higher costs due to Agent opportunism, 3) worse 
professional performance due to the mismatch between skills possessed and skills required by 
the job, as a result of adverse selection, and 4) perceived organizational injustice generates a 
higher rate of resignation on the part of family members  due to lower job satisfaction, 5) 
lower  organizational  citizenship behavior (OCB)  and  finally  6) a  lower  level  of work 
commitment by non-family members. In conclusion, the empirical literature does not seem to 
be  able  to  provide direct  evidence  on the benefits  (economic  and otherwise)  received  by 
members  rather than non- members.  Also missing is  evidence about unequal  treatment  of 
female and male members within the family, and its impact on job satisfaction, and, finally, 
from the literature it can be expected that most 'professionalized' family firms are less affected 
by distorting mechanisms than by others, but this is a fact that still does not emerge from the 
literature. It seems, in fact, very difficult to obtain data of this nature, and often the elicited 
responses are distorted, if not explicitly denied. For these reasons, this study used a qualitative 
protocol, collecting interview data that would otherwise have been difficult to obtain through 
other means (such as a questionnaires).
2 THE RESEARCH
The research was conducted over a period of 4 years (2009-2013), on a sample of family 
SMEs of Emilia Romagna (N = 88), using a qualitative protocol. The research was based on 
interviews  with the Agent family member, where at least one Agent did not belong to the 
family. The interview focused on elements typical of the Agency Theory: contract type, kind 
of supervision, agent  autonomy, mechanisms of resource  distribution, consistency between 
skills required and those possessed, and the overall level of perceived organizational justice. 
We chose a clinical approach because of the nature of the data, which discouraged the use of a 
quantitative method, such as self-reported questionnaires. It was feared that by using a self-
reported  questionnaire respondents would not provide truthful information, given the  nature 
of the information sought, the existence of discriminatory behavior against non-members, the 
level of perceived organizational justice by non-members,  mechanisms for the selection and 
career not based on merit, etc.).  It is therefore felt that, methodologically, the collection of 
data  through direct  conversation in  extreme confidentiality  is the  most  effective  choice, 
thanks  to  the  professional  secrecy which is  required  of  the  interviewer.  Furthermore,  to 
prevent resistance  and defense mechanisms by participants, the data were collected within 
already existing consultancy and tutoring activities, but formally with different purposes (such 
as,  for  example, actions to  design and  facilitate generational transmission or actions to 
improve the management of processes and policies Quality in SMEs). Despite the use of 
qualitative  methods,  we tried  to follow scrupulously the literature  guidelines (McCollom, 
1990;  Chenail,  2009),  in order to: produce  generalizable data about the universe of SMEs 
(external  validity);  achieve an  epistemologically unobjectionable  process  of  intervention; 
keep under control the distortion costs of the researcher; ensure a methodologically consistent 
system (internal validity).
1.1 The sample
The survey was conducted on 88 small and medium-sized family firms in seven Provinces 
of Emilia Romagna (PR 10, RE 26, MO 26, BO 6, RA 2, FC 10, RN 8). Little significance is 
attached to the average size of the sample (34 workers), in light of the high deviation standard 
(DS = 41),  and so  the median was calculated, as a  more  dependable measurement, which 
was equal to 16.
Overall, with regard to dimension,  more than 60% of the sample is less than or equal to 
25. The data on the universe (the complex of active enterprises in Emilia Romagna, including 
artisan  firms and individual  entrepreneurs),  indicate  that 53.6% had  only  one  employee, 
92.3% have up to 15 employees, large companies (> 250 employees) are 0.1% (Istat, 2011). 
Then this sample is characterized by a median size greater than the reference population. This 
is due, of course,  to the sample used (which includes only  minimally small businesses and 
individual entrepreneurs).
1.2 Methodology
Through an interview a  job  analisys and  skills  assessment  of  the  family  member was 
carried out (in terms of required skills, autonomy,  use of resources, etc.). For each company 
involved,  at least two interviews were carried out: of  a member belonging to the owner’s 
family and,  if  present,  of  a non-family  member, such  as  an  internal  customer.  The data, 
although qualitative, were collected and coded with a grid structured to detect the dimensions 
shown in Table 1.  As defined above,  data  collection was carried out in  already activated 
programs of  counseling and mentoring, but formally with different purposes (such as,  for 
example, programs  financed  to  facilitate  generational passage  or to  improve   quality 
management processes and policies quality in SME’s). These acts focused on job analysis and 
skills assessment, using both interviews that and analysis of available documentation (e.g., the 
Quality Manual). Each interview was repeated until complete collection, and this process had 
a duration from a minimum of 6 hours up to a maximum of 24 company hours.
1.3 Results 
Regarding  the  composition  of  the  sample  by  gender,  50  males  and  38  females  were 
interviewed as family members. Almost all (82) are children of the business ownerships, the 
remaining 3 are in-laws, especially the wives of the owners. At the time of the interview, 20 
were department/division heads, 21 employees/operationals, 3 were finally placed as interns 
or freelancers.  All were included in the company with a permanent contract,  except for 2 
interns and a  temp. With regard to career path, 34 respondents joined the company straight 
after school, nine held other jobs in different sectors, one working in another company in the 
same sector. The match between CV (skills, experience ) owned and skills required is on 
average  partial  (0.9):  in  particular  and  interestingly,  the  average  matching  of  the  male 
members of the family is 1.3, that of females 0,4 .
Table. 1:  Results 
Dimension Scale used Average value
Career path of the respondent
0  = only in  the  family,  1  =  in  other 
companies in  the same sector,  2 =  in 
other companies in other sector 0**
Match  between  job 
characteristics and CV 0 = no , 1 = partial , 2 = total 0,9
Job relevance 0 = none, 1 = poor, 2 = high 1,5 1,0*
Job autonomy
0 = poor , 1 = partial autonomy , 2 = 
full 1,9 0,2*
possibility  of  participation  in 
training
0 = no formalities, 1 = discussed each 
time,  2  =  only  determined  from  the 
property 1,9 0,3*
use  by  the  respondent  of 
capital goods 0 = never , 1 = sometimes , 2 = always 1,4 0,1*
use  by the  respondent of 
corporate human resources 0 = never , 1 = sometimes , 2 = always 0,1 0,1*
level  of  shared 
goals/organizational strategies
0 = none, 1 = in exceptional cases, 2 = 
regularly 0,5
the  level  of  access to 
information
0 = none, 1 = in exceptional cases, 2 = 
regularly
0,4
perceived  level  of 
discrimination experienced
0 = no  discrimination, 1 =  sometimes 
subject  to discrimination,  2  =  always 
discriminated against
0,9
level  of  perceived 
organizational justice
0 = unfair situation, 1 = neither just nor 
unjust, 2 = very fair
0,9
*average values in the perception of internal customer
**Median 
The importance of the organizational task being performed by the members of the family is 
systematically higher in the perception of the owner with respect to the partner (on average 
1.5  and  1.0  ,  respectively).  The  data  also  shows  that  the  autonomy  of  the  job  and  the 
discretionary nature of the time management is much higher for family members than non- 
members of the same task (1.9 to 0.2), and for female than male (1,9 to 1,6). Similarly, with 
regard  to  the  opportunity  to  participate  in  courses  and  training  activities  without  any 
formalities (on average 1.9 family members , 0.3 for the others) . In addition, members of the 
family have greater freedom to use for their own private purposes items such as capital goods 
company car, phone , tablet , etc. ( on average, 1.4 ) compared to non- family members, who 
in  fact  are  not  permitted  use  of  these  things,  unless  as  exceptions  (mean,  0.1)  .  Human 
resources,  however,  are  almost  never  used  for  purposes  unrelated  to  work  or  by  family 
members or others.
Furthermore,  it  seems overall very poor practice to  involve or  at  least even  inform 
employees who are not non-family members with regard to strategies, development programs, 
major investments, with the exception of when they are part of the property, participate in 
governance bodies or hold positions of responsibility. The perception of these elements is 
substantially  identical between families  and  non-families,   (0.5  and  0.4,  respectively).
The overall level of discrimination perceived by non-members is average (0.9): non-members 
sometimes feel discriminated  with respect to  members, but that  seems to have no particular 
effect  on perceived organizational  justice.  The  majority of  non-members of  the  family 
respondents consider the company where  they work as  neither just nor unjust,  but basically 
balanced. Results are shown in Table 1.
3 FINDINGS
First, the vast majority of junior members of the family go right into the company, with no 
work experience, or in the same sector (at  a major supplier’s, customer’s)  or in any other 
sector. With some differences, however, in relation to gender: a third of the daughters (32% 
versus 12% of males) first try another path, in a different industry, with a decision to join the 
family that comes a little later,  or even as something to fall back on. This is also consistent 
with the findings in relation to the match between personal skills and competences required. 
The sample shows that the male members have a significantly better fit than female  (1.3 
compared to 0.4): the calculated chi-square with 2 df is equal to 14.41, much higher than the 
critical chi-square for α = 0.05 is equal to 5,991. This allows us to reject the null hypothesis of 
independence of the variables, and establish a  an initial body of evidence:  the family firms 
have a high level of adverse selection, a level that  becomes even greater (about three  times 
more) if a daughter is to enter the firm. So,  there is confirmation of the hypothesis H1: family  
firms are characterized by adverse selection of family members,  in particular as regards the 
females. The organizational relevance (in terms of strategic output) of the work performed by 
family members is placed in doubt by the perception of colleagues. The widespread lack of 
management by objectives and the exclusive use of permanent contracts on an hourly basis 
does not allow a proper measurement of the output produced by the owner of the job. Another 
critical  factor  thus appears:  family members very often  hold jobs of dubious value, often 
designed adhoc to  find  a  place in  the  workforce for  a  son / daughter /  relative. Family 
members enjoy privileges relating to the management of their work (e.g., time) and benefits 
such as the use of instrumental  resources for private  purposes,  with a difference between 
males and females: the latter enjoy greater freedom (especially  due to child care).  They can 
also be absent from work to attend training,  conferences,  seminars  during working hours. 
Since employment contracts are based on the hourly rate of pay in a fixed salary, these data 
seem to provide evidence which supports the hypothesis H2: family firms are characterized 
by opportunism of family members. The difference with non-members is, in fact, equal to the 
entire rating scale (1.9 versus 0.2), i.e.,for non -members any possibility of flexible working 
hours is precluded beyond the provisions of the work contract. Participation in training events 
is usually subject to the approval of a superior, if not rigidly managed by it. The data show no 
difference between family members and non-members as to the type of contract in place. So, 
there is no evidence that family members have access to additional monetary resources or 
other rewards as opposed to non-members,  or that wage differentials are present  for equal 
work (for example, the superminimum). Thus, based on these data, hypothesis H3 is partially  
confirmed:  family  firms are  characterized  by discrimination of   non-relatives. This 
discriminatory behavior is related to organizational aspects (time management and schedules) 
but not to other aspects such as pay and incentives. Finally, hypothesis H4 is not confirmed:  
family firms are characterized by low levels of organizational justice, as  perceived by non-
family members. Family firms are considered to be neither just nor unjust, but balanced.
4 CONCLUSION 
The opportunistic behavior of family members seems grounded in family SMEs.  When 
daughters were questioned about it (" Don’t you think that the fact that you are free to manage 
your work almost as you want might generate discontent in others?"), they  often explained 
their opportunistic behavior as obvious ('the company is mine, after all, the business risk is 
ours'),  considering  it  an  intrinsic  element in  the  situation. This  is  consistent  with some 
evidence in the literature, such as the greater satisfaction of women (Cohen-Carash, Spector, 
2001;  Barnett, Kellermans,  2006),  due to job flexibility  (getting to work,  leave leaving  or 
being  absent according to the needs and health of school children).  The data shows a clear 
inability to separate organizational aspects from personal  ones, to distinguish family relations 
as hierarchical relationships.  And this is the source of the economic costs described by the 
Agency Theory: moral hazard,  adverse selection,  opportunism of the agent. Employees who 
do not belong to the family are  poorly informed about  decisions of strategic  importance, 
unless  they belong  to  management. Sometimes they feel  discriminated,  but  these  two 
elements do  not  seem to have  an  impact on  the  perception  of organizational  justice:  the 
company is perceived as neither just nor unjust, but basically  balanced.  In the light of the 
existing literature,  this is quite surprising. Evidently, even by non-members it  is considered 
correct (in terms of of procedural and distributive justice)  to resort to the criterion of need, 
rather than merit or equality, to  get  benefits: flexible work hours or 'use of corporate assets 
(telephone, car) for private purposes. All this seems contrary to what is predicted by the SIT. 
The research findings do not support the relationship between identification with the ingroup 
and intergroup differentiation:  not  always is  there  a bias towards  the outgroup.  So the 
assumption is that the basic processes of social identity are more complex than Tajfel argues 
(1978; 1981; 1982), and worthy of further investigation within the organization. For example, 
opportunistic behavior toward a family-owned by the family itself, which emerges from the 
research,  takes  the  form  of ingroup favoritism,  and  then in  contrast  to  the SIT.  Not 
surprisingly, for  some  years  the psychosocial literature has  raised  criticisms  of  the SIT 
(Brown, ref?):  The  author  reports  the  fact that,  especially  in  field  studies,  outgroup 
discrimination  is  far  from being  an  automatic  phenomenon.  Indeed,  there  is  a  possible 
occurrence of favoritism towards the outgroup, or  the same group favors the ingroup of a 
certain size, the outgroup of another and none of others, again in contradiction with the SIT.
5 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
The  first limitation is of course methodological:  the sample size and the protocol used 
impose caution on the generalizability of the findings.  Future research will need to validate 
the results on a larger scale.  The second limitation is the choice to involve in research only 
one family member per firm, with the result of of an over-simplification of the organizational 
reality.  Often, in fact,  family firms are characterized by a variety of generations but also of 
bloodlines (Ferrari,  2005).  Future research should investigate whether the theoretical model 
presented here is also valid in different situations, such as those characterized by the presence 
of brothers and/or cousins.
This article, despite the methodological limitations due to the qualitative approach and the 
size of the sample, is perhaps the only empirical contribution in the field of agency costs in 
small  and medium-sized Italian families. In  a small  family  business,  agency  costs seem 
greater  than  for  similar non-family  SMEs.  Often,  children (especially daughters)  enjoy 
freedoms that other employees do not have, hold a job for which they are not prepared and, 
moreover, their tasks are of dubious value to the organization. Data shows therefore greater 
attention to non-economic objectives than economic ones.
The findings suggest some practical implications.  First, there seems to emerge the need for 
family SMEs to become more professional (Chua, Chrisman, Bergiel, 2009), beyond the costs 
that this  option can  represent. Only  the acquisition  of  instruments for  monitoring  and 
managing for results can help SMEs to reduce the effects of overlapping in family-enterprises, 
and finalizing the behavior of family members to the business objectives of economic nature. 
The professionalized firm must  evaluate  the performance of family members  and provide 
incentives  that  will  motivate  them to  achieve  the  firm’s  goals. In  addition,  the evidence 
suggests  a  more critical situation  for  the family  business when  the new  generation  is 
represented  by a  daughter than  by  a  male.  This leads  us  to  carefully   consider  the 
implementation of  training and mentoring from high school on  for SMEs whose daughters 
express a wish to join the family business.  These courses could be organized by  employer 
associations.  Adverse  selection is  another endemic factor  in  SMEs family.  Beyond these 
research  findings,  it  would  be  advisable  to  investigate the  role played by  third  parties 
belonging to the family, such as mothers: they often are formally absent from the company, 
but it is assumed that they have an important role in decisions to hire children in the family 
firm.  Agency  Theory  characterizes  self-control  as  an  internal  conflict  resembling  the 
principal-agent conflict between the owner and manager of a firm (Thaler, Shefrin, 1981). 
According to this hypothesis, mothers  would be involved in the decision of the Principal to 
hire children in the family firm, a decision carried out in conditions of conflict of interest. 
Finally,  with  regard to  the  phenomena  of social  categorization and intergroup 
discrimination, this article does not provide evidence that supports SIT. It therefore becomes 
necessary to explore other approaches borrowed from social psychology. A promising line of 
research for example was started some years ago by Deaux and colleagues  (2011), which 
explores the different functions of relational processes and affective identification with the 
group, processes hitherto considered only cognitive. According to the author, in this context it 
is not to be taken for granted that the SIT will generate positive identities, and thus it is not 
obvious that the outcome is the identification of biological group membership (in this case, 
the owner  family).  Future  research,  therefore,  is  called  for  to  investigate the  affective, 
relational, motivational dimensions of these processes of identification with the ingroup.
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